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INTRODUCTION

"The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives." I Due to
the advent of pregnancy prevention devices such as prescription contraceptives, women
are able to postpone childbirth while investing in academic degrees and careers. 2 Because prescription methods of contraceptives are currently available to women only, it is
women who typically bear the financial burden of the cost of birth control. 3 Since birth
control is the most commonly-prescribed drug for women between the ages of eighteen
and forty-four, 4 perhaps it is unsurprising that, when compared to men, women of repro-5
ductive age spend sixty-eight percent more on out-of-pocket health care expenditures.
6
This disparity is due, in large part, to the cost of reproductive health care services.
Though it is well established that the Constitution protects a woman's right to use
birth control, 7 the issue of whether all women should have access to it at the behest of
the federal government has long been a source of political and legislative debate. 8 Proponents of mandatory contraceptive coverage legislation are primarily concerned with
the overwhelming percentage of unintended pregnancies in the United States, which absorbs billions of taxpayer dollars each year 9 and contributes to the number of abortions

1. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (internal citation omitted).
2.

History & Successes, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/who-we-

are/history-and-successes.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2012) ("Women's progress in recent decades-in education, in the workplace, in political and economic power can be directly linked to ...women's ability to control their own fertility.").
3. Pema Levy, Does Providing Birth Control Without Co-Pays to Women Let Men off the Hook?,
AMERICAN PROSPECT (Aug. 5, 2011), http://prospect.org/article/trqian-plan. Under many health insurance
plans, women must often pay twenty to fifty dollars per month for oral contraceptives and hundreds of dollars
for longer-acting methods. Michelle Andrews, Preventing Pregnancy: Should Patients Get Contraceptives
from
Health
Plans
at
No
Cost?,
KAISER
HEALTH
NEWS
(July
6,
2010),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Features/Insu ring-Your-Health/cost-of-birth-control.aspx.
4. N.C Aizenman, New U.S. Rules Require Insurance Coveragefor Contraception,WASH. POST (Aug. 1,
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/new-us-rules-require-insurance-coverage-forcontraception/2011/08/01/gIQAwdTRol story.html.
5. PlannedParenthoodApplauds Sen. Stabenou and Rep. Schakowsky Jor Introduction of Health Care
for Women Act, PLANNED PARENTHOOD (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/ (follow "About
Us" hyperlink; then follow "Newsroom" hyperlink; then follow "Press Releases" hyperlink then search "Press
Releases" for "Stabenow"; then follow "PLANNED PARENTHOOD APPLAUDS SEN. STABENOW
AND..." hyperlink) [hereinafter Planned Parenthood].See also Affordable Care Act Rules on Expanding Access
to
Preventive
Services
for
Women,
HEALTHCARE.GOV
(Aug.
1,
2011),
http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011 /08/womensprevention0801201 Ia.html [hereinafter Expanding
Access] (explaining that, compared to men, women typically need more preventive health services but usually
have fewer financial resources to pay for them).
6. PlannedParenthood,supra note 5.
7. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwanted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.").
8. See generally Megan Colleen Roth, Note, Rocking the Cradle iwith Erikson v. Bartell Drug Co.: Contraceptive Insurance Coverage Takes a Step Foriiard,70 UMKC L. REV. 781 (2002) (arguing that federal contraceptive coverage legislation is warranted to decrease the percentage of unintended pregnancies and abortion
in the United States).
9. Rebecca Wind, Nation Pays Steep Pricefor High Rates of Unintended Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER INST.
(May 19, 2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/nr/2011/05/19/index.html.
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performed.' 0 Conversely, Catholic individuals and affiliated organizations deem any act
that renders procreation impossible as "intrinsically evil"1 I and therefore stand in
staunch opposition to laws that force them to partake in coverage of contraceptive medi12
cations.

While the majority of state legislatures have enacted laws that require the inclusion
of contraceptive drugs and devices in all health plans, 13 congressional efforts to pass
federal contraceptive coverage legislation have consistently failed. 14 The federal government's inability to mandate such coverage, however, ended on March 23, 2010, when
President Barack Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
("PPACA"), the first comprehensive health care reform bill in the United States. 15 In an
effort to make preventive health care for women more affordable, the PPACA requires
all health insurance plans 16 and issuers 17 to cover all items and services recommended
by the United States Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") without charging a co-payment, co-insurance, or a deductible. 8 This includes, amongst other medical

10. See Rebecca Wind, Abortion and UnintendedPregnancyDecline Worldiwide as Contraceptive Use Increases, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/nr/2009/1 0/13/index.html
("The evidence is strong and growing that empowering women with the means to decide for themselves when
to become pregnant and how many children to have significantly lowers unintended pregnancy rates and thereby reduces the need for abortion ....). According to experts, the cost of contraceptives is a contributing factor
to unintended pregnancies. Andrews, supra note 3. While women can purchase generic versions of birth control pills for prices as low as nine dollars a month, even modest co-pays can act as a deterrent. Ricardo AlonsoZaldivar, The Associated Press, Insurers to Cover Birth Control, FISCAL TIMES (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011 /08/ /AP-Insurers-to-Cover-Birth-Control.aspx#page 1.
11. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2730, at 629 (Doubleday, 2nd ed. 2003) (1994) ("'[E]very
action which, whether in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its accomplishment, or in the development of its
natural consequences, proposes, whether as an end or as a means, to render procreation impossible' is intrinsically evil.") (quoting PAUL VI, HUMANAE VITAE § 14 (1968)).
12. See Annamarya Scaccia, Religious Exemptions and Contraceptive Coverage: Hoi Far Can Denial Go
andStillBe Constitutional?,DAILY Kos (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/09/30/1021600
/-Religious-Exemptions-and-Contraceptive-Coverage:-How-Far-Can-Denial-Go-and-Still-BeConstitutional?detail-hide.
13. State Policies in Brief Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, GUTTMACHER INST. (Dec.. 1, 2011),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib JCC.pdf [hereinafter State Policies in Brie].
14. Insurance Coverage for Contraception: A Proven Way to Protect And Promote Women's Health,
NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA FOUNDATION 4 (Jan. 1,2010), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/factsheets/birth-control-insurance-coverage.pdf [hereinafter Insurance Coveragefor Contraception].
15. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 11-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as 42
U.S.C. §§ 18001 18121 (2012)).
16. "A group health plan is an employee welfare benefit plan established or maintained by an employer or
by an employee organization (such as a union), or both, that provides medical care for participants or their dependents directly through insurance, reimbursement, or otherwise." Health Plans and Benefits, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/index.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2012).
17. A health insurance issuer is [a]n insurance, insurance service, or insurance corporation (including an
HMO) that is required to be licensed to engage in the business of insurance in a state and that is subject to state
law
that
regulates
insurance."
Health Insurance
Issuer, U.S.
DEP'T
OF
LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/elaws/ebsa/health/glossary.htm?wd=Health Insurance Issuer (last visited Sept. 10, 2012).
18. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2713(a)(4) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 300gg 13 (2012)). To
assist the HHS in developing these comprehensive guidelines, the Institute of Medicine ("IOM")conducted a
scientific study of "preventive services [that] are important to women's health and well-being." Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps, INST. OF MED. 1 (July 19, 2011),
http://iom.edu/-/media/Files/Report/ 20Files/2011 /Clinical-Preventive-Services-for-Women-Closing-theGaps/preventiveservicesforwomenreportbrief updated2.pdf"' [hereinafter Preventive Services]. During the
study, "[the JOM] defined preventive health services as measures including medications, procedures, devices,
tests, education, and counseling-shown to improve well-being and/or decrease the likelihood or delay the onset of a targeted disease or condition." Id. at 1 2. According to the HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, "These
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items and services, all Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approved prescription
19
contraceptive methods.
Although employers that qualify as "religious" under the mandate may seek an exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement, the exemption criteria are inextricably narrow and only afford protection to churches, houses of worship, and monasteries. 20 Religion-based entities such as hospitals, colleges, universities, and charitable
organizations do not meet the criteria and are therefore excluded. 2 1 This restrictive exemption provision is particularly problematic for Catholic-affiliated organizations because they will be forced to comply with the mandate or pay a penalty for failing to do
so.2 2 As a result, numerous Catholic organizations across the country have reacted
strongly against the HHS's contraceptive regulation. 2 3 The United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops ("USCCB") has become the front-runner in attacking both the constitu24
tionality and legality of the mandate.
This article examines the USCCB's religious challenges to the contraceptive coverage mandate under the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution 25 as well as the statutory terms of the Religious Freedom Reformation Act of 1993 ("RFRA") 26 and, in doing
so, ultimately posits that the mandate does not violate the free exercise rights of Catholic
employers. Section 11 provides background information about the social and economic
benefits of prescription contraceptives and presents a brief overview of the contraceptive
equity legislation that preceded the HHS's contraceptive mandate. 2 7 Section III sets forth

the USCCB's objections to the contraceptive coverage mandate, focusing specifically on
its religious exercise challenges.2 8 Section IV evaluates the constitutionality of the conhistoric guidelines are based on science and existing literature and will help ensure women get the preventive
health benefits they need." Affordable CareAct Ensures Women Receive Preventive Services at No Additional
Cost, HHS.Gov (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/201 lpres/08/201 10801b.html [hereinafter No
Additional Cost].
19. No Additional Cost, supranote 18.
20. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 76 Fed. Reg. 46621, 46623 (Aug. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pt. 147) ("[T]he Departments seek to provide for a religious accommodation that respects the unique
relationship between a house of worship and its employees in ministerial positions.").
21. Julie Rovner, Religious Groups Want Relief from Birth Control Mandate, NPR (Nov. 2, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2011/11/02/141949921/religious-groups-want-relief-from-birth-controlmandate.
22. Igor Volsky, Pat Toomey: Religious Employers Need Additional Exemptionsfrom Offering Coverage
for Contraceptives, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 26, 2011), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2011/09/26/328588/pattoomey-religious-employers-need-additional -exemptions-from-offering-coverage-for-contraceptives/.
23. See Catholic Colleges Unite to Defend Religious Liberty, Oppose Illegal Contraceptive Mandate,
CARDINAL NEWMAN SoC'Y (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.cardinalnewmansociety.org/Home/tabid/36/ctl/
Details/mid/435/ItemID/1127/Default.aspx ("Eighteen Catholic colleges and universities ... joined [together]
in an appeal to the Obama administration to exempt all religious objectors from a mandate requiring health
insurance plans to cover ...contraceptives ....
");Scaccia, supra note 12.
24. See USCCB Urges Rescission of HHS ContraceptiveMandate, Criticizes 'Inexplicably Narrow' Definition of Religious Freedom, U.S
CONF.
OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS
(Aug.
31,
2011),
http://www.usccb.org/news/2011/11-168.cfm.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26. Religious Freedom Reformation Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012). Since 1997,
the RFRA has not applied to state law. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
27. See generally Staci D. Lowell, Note, Striking a Balance: Finding a Place for Religious Conscience
Clauses in ContraceptiveEquity Legislation,52 CLFV. ST. L. REv. 441,443-45 (2004 2005).
28. See Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Michael F. Moses, Interim Final Rule on Preventive Services, U.S.
CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS 2, 7 11, 13 (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.usccb.org/about/general-
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traceptive mandate as it relates to the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence, 29 and
30
Section V analyzes the legality of the mandate as it pertains to the terms of the RFRA.
Section VI concludes that, because the federal contraceptive coverage mandate does not
violate Catholic employers' constitutional or federally guaranteed free exercise rights,
Catholic-affiliated organizations are required to cover their employees' prescription con-

traceptives.31
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Benefits of PrescriptionContraceptives

Women derive many benefits from the use of prescription contraceptives. 32 For
example, when used consistently and correctly, oral contraceptives are ninety-nine percent effective in preventing unintended pregnancies. 33 In the United States, for every ten
women who are having sex, nine do not desire to become pregnant. 34 Since the average
American woman wants only two children, a woman must use contraceptives for approximately three decades if she wishes to remain sexually active throughout the duration of
her reproductive years. 35 Without contraceptives, a sexually active woman with normal
fertility has an eighty-five percent chance of conceiving a child within one year. 36 Due to
its effectiveness, ninety-eight percent of women in the United States have used contra37
ception at some point during their reproductive years.
An unintended pregnancy imposes detrimental consequences for both the woman
and her baby. 38 In the United States, half of all pregnancies are unintended, and of this

counsel/rulemaking/upload/comments-to-hhs-on-preventive-services-201 I-08.pdf.
29. See generally Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws
and Exceptions From Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (2000).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb 4.
31. See Empl't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990), supersededby statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb 4 (2012).
32. While contraceptives do provide many health benefits to women, they can pose serious health risks as
well. Studies have shown that contraceptives may increase women's risk of developing blood clots. FDA Drug
Safety Communication: Safety Review Update on the Possible IncreasedRisk ofBlood Clots iwith Birth Control
Pills
Containing Drospirenone, U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.
(Sept.
26,
2011),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm273021.htm. Additionally, taking hormonal contraceptives has been
linked to women acquiring HIV-1. Harold L. Martin Jr. et al., Hormonal Contraception, Sexually Transmitted
Diseases, and Risk of Heterosexual Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1, 178 J.
INFECTIOUS DISEASE 1053, 1053 (1998).
33. H.R. 463, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). "If [birth control] pills are taken every day at the same time, and
each pack is started on time, oral contraceptives are 99% effective in preventing pregnancy. On average, oral
contraceptives are 93-97o effective because women often miss pills or do not start a new pack on time." Oral
Contraceptives:
Birth
Control
Pills,
AM.
PREGNANCY
ASS'N,
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/preventingpregnancy/birthcontrolpills.html (last updated Aug. 2003).
34. Lowell, supranote 27, at 443.
35. Michelle Andrews, Health Insurers May Soon Offer Contraceptives at No Extra Cost, WASH. POST (July 6, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/02/AR2010070204641.html.
36. Omnia
M.
Samra,
Birth
Control
Behavioral
Methods,
EMEDICTNEHEALTH,
http://www.emedicinehealth.com/birth-control-behavioral-methods/article em.htm (last updated Aug. 8,

2005).
37. Title X, NAT'L FAM. PLANNING & REPROD. HEALTH Ass'N, http://www.nfprha.org/main/policyaction.
cfin?Category=Key NFPRHA Issues&Section=Titleo20X o2OAction o20Plan (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
38. See Adam Sonfield, Preventing Unintended Pregnancy: The Need and the Means, 6 GUTTMACHER REP.
ON PUB. POL'Y 7 (2003), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/06/5/grO60507.html.
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percentage, four in ten end in abortion. 39 These abortions impose physical and emotional
costs on women. 40 Because contraceptives are an effective means of preventing unintended pregnancies, it follows that affordable contraception decreases the number of
abortions performed. 4 1 Furthermore, women who become pregnant unintentionally are
less likely to receive timely prenatal care and are more likely to drink alcohol, smoke,
become depressed, and become victims of domestic violence during pregnancy. 42 Consequently, a child born as a result of an unintended pregnancy is at greater risk of being
born at a low weight, dying within the first year of life, being subject to abuse, and experiencing developmental problems later in life. 43 By preventing unintended pregnancies,
44
contraceptives have contributed to a dramatic decrease in maternal and infant mortality
and have improved women's overall health by allowing them to plan and space their
45
pregnancies.
Prescription contraceptives are not only preventive medications; they provide
many therapeutic health benefits as well. 46 Doctors often prescribe birth control pills to
treat medical conditions such as polycystic ovary syndrome, endometriosis, amenorrhea
(i.e., lack of periods), menstrual cramps, premenstrual syndrome, heavy periods, and acne. 47 Furthermore, since less menstrual bleeding occurs when taking oral contraceptive
pills, the likelihood of developing anemia, endometrial cancer, ovarian cancer, and ovar48
ian cysts decreases.
In addition to the many medical purposes it serves, the use of contraceptives poses
several social and economic benefits as well.4 9 By reducing the risk of unplanned pregnancy, contraceptives allow women to achieve greater freedom by enabling them to invest in a higher education and a career. 50 From a cost-benefit approach, contraceptive
coverage saves public and private health dollars that would otherwise be spent on expenditures derived from unintended pregnancies. 5 1 Even if a baby born as a result of an
39. Facts on

Induced

Abortions

in

the

United States,

GUTTMACHER

INST.

(Aug.

2011),

http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs /fb induced abortion.html. When considering the percentage of unintended
pregnancies that end in abortion, it is important to note that studies show that contraceptive programs do not
consistently reduce abortion rates. See Greater Access to Contraception Does Not Reduce Abortions, U.S.
CONF.

OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS (July 17, 2009),

http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-

dignity/contraception/greater-access-to-contraception-does-not-reduce-abortions.cfm.
40. Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L. REV. 363, 367
(1998). See also Adam Sonfield, PreventingUnintended Pregnancy: The Need and the Means, 6 GUTTMACHER
REP. ON PUB. POL'Y 7 (2003), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/06/5/grO60507.html.
41. See Law, supra note 40, at 367.
42. See Jason Kane, Women Should Get Free Birth Control,HHS-Backed Group Urges, PBS NEwSHOUR
(July 19, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2011/07/women-should-get-free-birth-control-hhsbacked-report-urges.html.
43. H.R. 463, 111thCong. § 2(2009).
44. Id.
45. ExpandingAccess, supra note 5.
46. See generally Medical Uses of the Birth Control Pill, CTR. FOR YOUNG WOMEN'S HEALTH,

http://www.youngwomenshealth.org/med-uses-ocp.htm (last updated Oct. 18, 2011).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Lowell, supranote 27 at 443-44.
50. Adam Sonfield, The Case for Insurance Coverage of Contraceptive Services and Supplies Without
Cost-Sharing, 14 GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV. 7 (2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/14/1/gpr140107.

pdf
51. See Law, supra note 40, at 366-68.
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unintended pregnancy is healthy, the financial costs associated with childbirth far outweigh the costs of contraceptive coverage. 52 For example, the average bill for a vaginal
birth, when accounting for facility variations, is $7,500, and the average bill for a cesarean section is $13,200. 53 Over a five-year study, researchers found that third-party payers,
i.e., employers who provide contraceptive coverage, generally benefit as a result of savings incurred through lower premium costs and increased profits. 54 According to the
Washington Business Group on Health and William M. Mercer, employers that include
contraceptive coverage in their employees' health plans save fifteen to seventeen percent
after factoring in the direct costs of pregnancy and the indirect costs associated with
pregnancy, e.g., employee absenteeism and decreased productivity. 55 Thus, it is economically efficient for employers to include contraceptive coverage in their employees'
56
health insurance plans.
B.

Legislative Backdrop: The Emergence of the HHS's Contraceptive Coverage
Mandate

While the emergence of contraceptive equity legislation has become prominent
among the states in the last decade, it was not until insurance companies began to cover
Viagra, a well-known male impotence drug, in the mid-1990s that interest groups began
pressuring lawmakers to pass mandatory contraceptive coverage legislation. 57 As a result
of this seeming inequity between the sexes, twenty-eight states have enacted some form
of contraceptive equity legislation to date. 58 However, state laws are unable to regulate
self-insured plans (plans funded by the employer instead of an insurance company),
which are governed exclusively by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"). 5 9 Since nearly half of all Americans who rely on employer-sponsored insurance work for employers offering self-insured plans, state efforts to provide women
unrestricted contraceptive access have proven only mildly effective. 60 In 1998, the federal government implemented the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan ("FEHBP"),
61
which extended coverage of all prescription contraceptives to federal employees.
Since the FEHBP only applies to federal workers, leaving millions of private-sector em-

52. Id. at 366.
53. Jennifer Brown, Women Pay up to 50% More for Health Insurance Premiums', DENVER POST (Oct. 25,

2009), http://www.denverpost.com/frontpage/ci 13636522.
54. James Trussell et al., The Economic Value of Contraception: A Comparison of 15 Methods, 85 AM. J.

PUB. HEALTH 494, 500 (1995).
55. Adam Sonfield, Contraception: An Integral Component of Preventive Care for Women, 13

GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV.2, 7 (2010), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/13/2/gprl30202.html.
56. See Covering Prescription Contraceptives in Employee Health Plans: How This Coverage Saves Mon-

ey, NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR. 1 2 (May 2006), http://www.cluw.org/PDF/ContraceptiveCoverageSaves
Money.pdf.
57. Contraceptive Equity Bills Gain Momentum in State Legislatures, CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS (Aug. 1,

2005),

http://reproductiverights.org/en/document/contraceptive-equity-bills-gain-momentum-in-state-

legislatures [hereinafter ContraceptiveEquity Bills].

58. State Policies in Brief supra note 13.
59. See Roth, supra note 8, at 788-89.
60. See Insurance Coverage for Contraception, supra note 14, at 3. See also Roth, supra note 8, at 792

("The maximum number of women who could possibly be affected by state laws is roughly thirteen percent.").
61. Cheyrl A. Danner, Prescription Contraceptives: Educate Yourself on the Discrimination You May Be
Suffering Because You Workfor a PrivateEducationalInstitution, 31 J. L. & EDUC. 513, 518 (2002).
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ployees without coverage, Congress has repeatedly introduced the Equity in Prescription
Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act ("EPICC"). 62 The EPICC would require all
health plans, including self-insured plans, that provided coverage for prescription drugs
to provide comparable coverage for all FDA-approved prescription contraceptive methods. 63 Due to religious freedom concerns, however, the EPICC lacked the support necessary for passage. 64 Thus, the HHS mandate is the first piece of federal legislation that
extends contraceptive coverage to every health plan in the United States. 65 Since it
reaches self-insured plans as well as plans that do not provide prescription drug coverage, it is the most comprehensive contraceptive mandate in the history of the United
66
States.
Ill. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS' SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS
In response to the HHS's contraceptive coverage mandate, the USCCB submitted a
comment in which it urged the HHS to reconsider its decision to include contraceptives
as a preventive service. 67 In setting forth its religious objections to the contraceptive
mandate, the USCCB vehemently argued that requiring employers to provide contraceptive coverage in their health plans violates a spectrum of constitutional and other federally guaranteed rights. 68 Specifically, the USCCB asserts that the mandate violates constitutional guarantees under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as well as
69
statutory protections under the terms of the RFRA.
As a basis for its challenges, the USCCB claims that the contraceptive mandate
triggers strict scrutiny 70
the highest level of judicial review
pursuant to which laws
and regulations must be "narrowly tailored" to achieve a "compelling government interest" to pass constitutional muster. 71 When determining the constitutionality of a particular law, the court's standard of review is very important to, if not dispositive of,the outcome. 72 Here, the USCCB argues that disease prevention is not a compelling
government interest because contraceptives do not prevent disease; rather, contraceptives
are a method by which women "prevent the healthy state of pregnancy."' 73 Moreover, the

62. Id.
63. Lowell, supra note 27, at 451.
64. See Danner, supra note 61.
65. See Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 4.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1.
68. Id. at 5-13.
69. Id. at 7 13. USCCB also challenges the constitutionality and legality of the inclusion of sterilization
and contraceptive counseling in the comprehensive guidelines and argues that mandating coverage of contraceptives, sterilization, and related counseling violates the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 2, 13. Since certain FDA-approved contraceptives are believed by some to operate as abortion-inducing medications, the
USCCB contends that the mandate violates the Weldon Amendment and the PPACA's abortion and nonpreemption provisions. Id. at 5 7. These issues are outside the scope of this comment.
70. Id. at9-10.
71. See generally ConstitutionalLaii
FirstAmendment En Banc Third Circuit Strikes Doiwn Federal
Statute Prohibiting the Interstate Sale of Depictions of Animal Cruelty.

United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d

218 (3d Cir. 2008) (En Banc), 122 HARV. L. REv. 1239, 1242 (2009) (discussing the importance of the application of strict scrutiny in First Amendment analysis).
72. Id. at 1239 43.
73. Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 10-11.
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USCCB argues, Congress itself did not seek to include contraceptive coverage in the
PPACA; therefore, the HHS's decision to include contraceptives as a preventive service
cannot possibly fulfill a compelling government interest. 74 In the alternative, the USCCB
argues that, even if the government could prove that its interest was somehow compelling, the means used to achieve that interest - i.e., the contraceptive mandate - are not
narrowly tailored because several religious organizations and individuals will drop health
insurance coverage altogether to avoid compromising their beliefs. 75
The Free Exercise Clause is embedded within the First Amendment of the Constitution, which provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 76 As a basis for its free exercise challenge, the USCCB argues that the federal contraceptive coverage mandate triggers strict
scrutiny review because, while neutral on its face, it implicitly targets Catholicism in its
operation and therefore discriminates against religion. 77 Alternatively, the USCCB alleges that because the mandate forces those religiously opposed to contraceptive use to
contradict their religious beliefs, the mandate imposes a "substantial burden" upon Catholic employers. 78 Since the mandate provides a religious exemption for a select group of
Catholic organizations, the USCCB argues that this substantial burden is applied pursuant to a system of "individualized exemptions," thereby triggering strict scrutiny re79
view.
In addition to asserting objections pursuant to these constitutional theories, the
USCCB argues that the contraceptive coverage mandate is unlawful because it violates
the RFRA, which provides that the government may not "substantially burden a person's exercise of religion," even by a law of general applicability, without demonstrating
that the application of that burden is "the least restrictive means" to advance a "compel81
ling government interest."
In sum, the USCCB demands that the HHS rescind the contraceptive mandate in its
entirety. 82 If the HHS is unwilling to do so, the USCCB argues, then it must expand the
narrow religious exemption to rectify the grave constitutional and legal problems that
currently exist. 83 The USCCB warns the H-H-S that unless it promulgates a broader exemption that encompasses all stakeholders with a religious objection to contraceptives,
84
the courts will not uphold the mandate as applied to Catholic organizations.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 11.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 8 9.
Id. at 9 10.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 13.
Religious Freedom Reformation Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb l(a) (b) (2012).
Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 23.
Id.
See id.
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THE SUPREME COURT'S FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE AND ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS

Limitation of Free ExerciseProtection

As a nation founded upon the principle of religious freedom, the United States remains wedded to the notion of religious practice free from governmental intrusion. 8 5 The
principle of religious freedom as protected by the First Amendment is not, however,
without limitation; 86 the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence establishes the degree to which the government may infringe upon an individual's practice of religion. 87 In
discerning whether a governmental law or regulation unconstitutionally interferes with
an individual's manifestation of religion, the Supreme Court has distinguished between
"religious beliefs" and "religious conduct." 88 In 1940, the Supreme Court first began articulating rules pertaining to when the government can impose regulations that infringed
on individuals' free exercise rights. 8 9 In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court distinguished religious beliefs from religious conduct, stating that the Free Exercise Clause
"embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but,
in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for
the protection of society. ' 9 1 Cantwell clearly conveyed that while religious beliefs and
speech are absolute, freedom of individual conduct that is motivated by religious belief is
92
afforded less protection.
B.

The Sherbert Test

Prior to 1900, the Supreme Court applied the "substantial burden" test to almost all
general laws that burdened the free exercise of religion, whereby a law imposing a substantial burden on religion cannot be enforced unless it survives strict scrutiny
i.e.,
93
serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. The
Supreme Court first applied the substantial burden test in 1963 in the landmark case of
Sherbert v. Verner,9 4 where the Court held that the State's interest in preventing the filing of fraudulent unemployment compensation claims was not compelling enough to jus-

85. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. ofAbington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 23(1963) ("The Free Exercise Clause ...withdraws from legislative power, state and federal, the exertion of any restraint on the free
exercise of religion.").
86. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986) (holding that the government need not comply
with an individual's claim that making his Social Security number available violated his religious beliefs).
87. Katherine A. White, Note, Crisis of Conscience: Reconciling Religious Health Care Providers' Beliefs
and Patients' Rights, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1703, 1725 (1999) (explaining that the Supreme Court's free exercise
jurisprudence established the boundaries for government infringement on an individual's religious practices).
88. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion
or Belief in the UnitedStates, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1187, 1200 (2005).
89. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 303 04.
92. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983) (citation omitted) ("Not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional ....The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that
it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.").
93. The Supreme Court made exceptions to the application of strict scrutiny for laws and regulations dealing with prisons and the military. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (prisons); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1986) (military).
94. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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tify infringing on a citizen's right to free exercise. 95 The plaintiff in Sherbert, a member
of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, was fired for refusing to work on Saturday because her religion forbade laboring on that day. 96 Because the plaintiff refused to work
on Saturdays, she was unable to locate new employment and subsequently filed an application for unemployment benefits. 9 7 The state unemployment commission denied the
plaintiff benefits on the ground that she would not "accept suitable work when of98

fered."
In applying the substantial burden test to the Free Exercise Clause for the first
time, the Court first inquired as to whether the State's action did in fact substantially
burden the plaintiff because of her religious beliefs. 99 The Court observed that the
State's denial of benefits to the plaintiff "derive[d] solely from the practice of her religion ... and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of
her religion ... on the other hand."'100 This type of burden on the free exercise of religion, the Court believed, was tantamount to imposing a fine against an individual for
worshipping on Saturday. 101 Next, the Court examined whether or not the State's action
furthered a compelling state interest. 1 02 In response to this inquiry, the Court held that
the State's unemployment statute abridged the plaintiffs right to free exercise of her religion because the State's interest in unifying its unemployment compensation rules to
prevent fraudulent religious objections was not compelling. 103 Additionally, the Court
found that even if the State's interest in unifying its unemployment benefits rules was
compelling, it would nevertheless be incumbent upon the government to prove that the
law was narrowly tailored and that, as such, it was the least restrictive means of further104
ing that interest.
The most prominent application of the substantial burden test came nine years later
in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 10 5 which modified the Sherbert test by requiring that the religious
belief at issue be "legitimate." 10 6 In Yoder, the Court analyzed whether the Free Exercise
Clause protected the Amish community's belief that children should not go to school
through the age of sixteen by asking whether the belief was "one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living." 107 Finding
that the belief satisfied all three criteria, the Court held that the application of Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law was invalid as applied to Amish students. 10 8 The
Court justified its extensive analysis by reasoning that, "[w]here fundamental claims of

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 407.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 399-400.
Id. at 401 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 403.
Id. at 404.
Id.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 406-07.
Id. at 407.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 214-15.
Id. at216.
Id.at216 17,234.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2012

11

STALLNGS (Do NOT DELETE)

1/23/2013 12:49 PM

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 48 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 5
128

TULSA LAW RE VIEW

Vol. 48:1

religious freedom are at stake,... we must searchingly examine the interests that the
State seeks to promote ... and the impediment to those objectives that would flow from
recognizing the claimed ... exemption." 10 9 The balancing test of Sherbert, as modified
by Yoder, came to be known as the substantial burden test, which can be articulated as
follows: if a law substantially burdens an individual's free exercise of religion, the government must exempt the religious believer from the law, unless the government can
demonstrate that the law serves a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 110 This test governed free exercise jurisprudence until
1990.111
C.

The Smith Test

In 1990, however, the Supreme Court limited the applicability of the substantial
burden test in Employment Division v. Smith. 112 In Smith, the Court held that laws of
"neutral law and general applicability" need not be subject to strict scrutiny review, even
if the laws have the incidental effect of burdening religious free exercise. 113 Thus, the
Court restricted the application of the substantial burden test so as to only invalidate laws
that specifically target a religious practice. 114 In Smith, the South Carolina unemployment commission denied two men unemployment compensation benefits after they were
fired from their jobs for ingesting peyote, a hallucinogenic drug used by adherents to the
Native American Church for sacramental purposes. 1 15 Since peyote was a prohibited
substance under the State's law, the unemployment agency determined that the employees were discharged for "misconduct" and, therefore, ineligible for unemployment bene1
fits. 16
The plaintiffs claimed that the State's refusal to grant them unemployment benefits
based on their use of peyote was a violation of their free exercise rights under Sherbert's
test.1 17 The Court, however, held that the State's denial of the plaintiffs' employment
compensation benefits did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 118 As a basis for its
holding, the Court noted that the law at issue was neutral because it did not specifically
target the Native American Church and was generally applicable because it prohibited all
citizens from using peyote. 119 The Court explained that:
[t]he government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions
of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of

109. Id. at221.
110. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Sherbert,374
U.S. 398.
111. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), supersededby statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 878-79 (holding that where a restraint on religion "is not the object ... but merely the incidental
effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended").
114. See id. at 878.
115. Id. at 874.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 876.
118. Id. at 890.
119. Id. at 878.
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policy, "cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development." To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is
"compelling"-permitting him by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law
unto himself,"-contradicts both constitutional tradition and common
sense. 120
Thus, Smith implicitly overruled Sherbert by establishing that unless a challenged
law or regulation intentionally discriminates against religious conduct, courts have no
discretion to decide whether or not the plaintiff should be granted a religious exemption
from the law. 121 Smith alleviated the strictness of this new rule, however, by preserving
the courts' ability to apply strict scrutiny when the government action "len[ds] itself to
122
individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct."
Smith set a new standard for free exercise jurisprudence, which can be expressed as follows: when a law lacks neutrality, general applicability, or is applied pursuant to a system of individualized exceptions, the law must survive strict scrutiny review to avoid violating the Free Exercise Clause. 123 The meanings of each of these standards, as
developed and refined by subsequent case law, are discussed in turn below.
1.

Neutral and General Applicability

In Smith, the Supreme Court merely laid out the bare contours of the "neutral and
generally applicable" test, providing relatively little guidance to lower courts as to how
the test should be applied in future cases. 124 Since Smith, only one Supreme Court decision has interpreted and applied the neutral and generally applicable test: Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah.125 In Lukumi, the plaintiffs were adherents of the
Santeria religion, which sacrifices animals as a form of worship. 12 6 After the Santerians
announced their plans to establish a house of worship in Hialeah, Florida, the city adopted ordinances prohibiting ritual sacrifice of animals, which it claimed furthered the government's interest in promoting public health and preventing animal cruelty. 127 After
concluding that the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable, the Court

120. Id. at 885 (internal citations omitted).
121. Id. at 878.
122. Id. at 884. Many cases following Sherbert involved religious individuals who were denied unemploy-

ment benefits by government employees who were accorded a high degree of discretion in assessing applicants' eligibility benefits. See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding that denial
of unemployment benefits to worker who refused to work on Sundays violates free exercise rights); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (holding that denial of unemployment benefits
to Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturdays violates free exercise rights); Thomas v. Review
Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that denial of unemployment benefits to Jeho-

vah's Witness who quit job in factory when transferred to manufacturing armaments position violates free exercise rights).
123. Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1074.
124. Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
125. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).

126. Id.
127. Id.
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applied strict scrutiny. 12 8 The Court held that the law was unconstitutional because the
government could have achieved the goal of safe and sanitary disposal of animal remains
without targeting the Santeria religion - i.e., the ordinance was not the least restrictive
means of accomplishing the purported interest. 129
When evaluating whether a law is neutral as applied to a religious practice, a
court's fundamental concern is whether the government intends to prohibit conduct for
"religiously motivated" reasons. 130 When conducting this determination, three questions
are relevant: (1) "does the law target religious practices on its face?" 13 1; (2) if the law is
neutral on its face, does it discriminate "in its object or purpose?" 132; and (3) if the law
has a discriminatory intent, "[d]oes the law discriminate in its actual operation or effect?" 133 In applying this tripartite test in Lukumi, the Court noted that the law prohibiting the ritual sacrifice of animals was facially neutral. 134 Nonetheless, the Court
acknowledged its duty to inquire further to determine whether the law was discriminatory in its object or purpose. 135 Therefore, the Court reviewed the legislative record for any
evidence that was suggestive of discriminatory intent on the part of the legislators. 136
Under this examination, the Court found that the particular resolution adopted recited
that residents of the city had expressed their concerns regarding a certain religion's practices. 137 The resolution also reiterated the city's commitment to prohibiting such acts by
religious groups. 138 Furthermore, the Court noted that the text of the ordinance spoke of
"sacrifice" and "ritual," which the Court believed offered support for a finding of discriminatory intent in the legislative record. 139 Review of this evidence, however, did not
conclude the Court's inquiry as to the neutrality of the law, for, as the Court indicated, a
law must actually discriminate in its effect to be considered an unconstitutional burden
140
on the free exercise of religion.
In evaluating the effect of the ordinances, the Court delved into a general applicability analysis, which focuses on the design, construction, and enforcement of a law and

128. Id. at 546-47.
129. Id. at 546.
130. See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1076.
131. Id. at 1077 "[A] law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning
discernible from the language or context." Id. (quoting Lukuni, 508 U.S. at 533).
132. Id. "Relevant evidence includes, among other things, the historical background of the decision under
challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment of official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking
body." Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540. It is not completely clear whether a neutrality inquiry should entail delving
into the subjective motivations of the legislature or should only focus on the effect of the law in its operation.
See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1076 n.146 (noting that Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority in Lukumi, but
only Justice Stevens joined the part of the opinion in which the Court found that the judiciary should consider
circumstantial evidence).
133. Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1077.
134. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534-35.
135. Id. at 534.
136. Id. at 534-35.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 534 (noting that while the use of the words "sacrifice" and "ritual" were not sufficient to compel a
finding that the legislature targeted the Santeria religion, the words did garner support for the conclusion that
there was discriminatory intent on the part of the legislature in drafting the ordinance).
140. Id. at 535.
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is best suited for determining whether the law's actual purpose is to discriminate against
a religious practice. 14 1 When conducting a general applicability inquiry, two questions
are relevant, and an affirmative response to either question is sufficient to determine that
a law lacks general applicability. 142 First, did the legislature design the law to achieve a
specific, as opposed to a general, purpose? 14 3 And second, does the construction of the
law warrant an actual operation that exclusively targets religious conduct or a particular
144
religion?
In light of the city's purported interest in preventing animal cruelty, the Lukumi
Court focused on the exceptions to the law that allowed the killing of animals by other
religions, such as kosher slaughtering of animals, as well as those that allowed the killing
of animals for nonreligious purposes, such as hunting. 145 Because the ordinances were
designed to proscribe animal killings for religious sacrifice, but to exclude virtually all
secular killings, the Court noted that the ordinances constituted a "religious gerrymander" and, as such, "an impermissible attempt to target [Santeria believers] and their religious practices." ' 14 6 When evaluating the actual operation of the law, the Court found
that the rituals of Santeria Church members were virtually the only conduct subject to the
ordinance.147 This led the Court to conclude that the law, while neutral on its face, specifically targeted Santeria religious practices in operation.148 Therefore, the Court determined that the ordinance was neither neutral nor generally applicable, and as such, the
constitutionality of the ordinance was subject to strict scrutiny review. 149
2.

The HHS's Contraceptive Mandate is Neutral and Generally Applicable

Pursuant to free exercise jurisprudence established by Smith and Lukumi, the
USCCB argues that the HHS mandate constitutes a "'religious gerrymander' that targets
Catholicism" and that, while neutral on its face, the mandate discriminates in its actual
operation. 150 In reaching this conclusion, the USCCB misconstrues the reasoning in
15 1
Lukumi and incorrectly applies the neutral and general applicability test.
152
Upon an initial textual reading of the mandate, it appears facially neutral.
Therefore, pursuant to the Smith test, a court must look to any evidence that suggests the
HHS intended to discriminate against Catholicism. 153 In its comment to the HHS, the
USCCB notes that many secular employers provided contraceptive coverage to their employees prior to the federal mandate, which indicates that the purpose of the mandate is

141. Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1077.
142. See id.
at 1078-79.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 1078.
Id. at 1079.
Lukurn 508 U.S. at 536-37.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 535 36.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 542 57.
Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 8 (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535).

151. Lukuin, 508 U.S. at 535-37.

152. Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011).
153. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534.
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to force employers with religious objections to do the same. 154 In Lukumi, the Court noted that it would consider certain types of evidence when evaluating discriminatory intent. 155 Such evidence includes, but is not limited to, the historical background of the
government's challenged action, events preceding the enactment of the law at issue, and
administrative or legislative history. 156 Since the percentage of secular employers that
provided contraceptive coverage prior to the federal mandate provides relevant historical
background information, this evidence may suggest that the purpose of the mandate is to
discriminate against the Catholic religion.' 57 Therefore, a court must determine whether
158
the mandate actually discriminates in operation.
Although the USCCB adopts Lukumi's phrasing - claiming the mandate is a "religious gerrymander" 159 _ the circumstances that prompted the particular fimding in
Lukumi do not exist here. 160 In Lukumi, the Court found that the ordinances were designed to regulate the specific animal killings by Santeria Church members as opposed to
the killings of animals in general. 16 1 In this situation, the federal contraceptive coverage
mandate is very comprehensive with regard to the purported interest that it seeks to advance - i.e., providing women contraceptive coverage. 162 With the exception of health
plans that are grandfathered in, the mandate ensures that every woman with health insurance will have access to contraceptives as well as a host of other services that are vital to
women's reproductive well-being. 163
Furthermore, the construction of the contraceptive mandate does not warrant an actual operation that exclusively targets Catholicism. 164 The USCCB argues that, "the
class that suffers under the mandate is defined precisely by their beliefs." 165 This contention, however, is not accurate. 166 Employers associated with the Catholic Church are
not the only employers impacted by the mandate; indeed, several secular employers did
not provide contraceptive coverage prior to the federal mandate and must also conform
their conduct accordingly. 167 For this reason, there is no evidence that the mandate targets only Catholic practices or that the HHS has singled out the Catholic Church for purposes of discrimination. 168
Therefore, a correct application of the Court's reasoning in Lukumi warrants a

154. Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 8 n.16.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Lukuni, 508 U.S. at 540.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Picarello & Moses, supranote 28, at 8 (quoting Lukuni, 508 U.S. at 535).
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535 36.
Id. at 535-37.

162. Cf id. at 547 (noting that the uniform purpose of preventing cruelty to animals was extensively undermined by the numerous secular exceptions because animals that were killed for secular purposes, such as scientific research, would be no less likely to constitute animal cruelty than animals killed for religious purposes).
163. See ExpandingAccess, supra note 5.

164. Cf Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535 ("[A]lmost the only conduct subject to [the ordinances was] the religious
exercise of Santeria church members.").
165. Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 8.
166. Cf Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535.
167. See generally State Policies in Brief,supra note 13.
168. Cf Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535.
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finding that the HHS mandate is both neutral and generally applicable. 169 Thus, the
mandate will not be subject to strict scrutiny review under the Free Exercise Clause unless it contains a "mechanism for individualized exemptions," i.e., the Sherbert exception
170
applies.
3.

The Sherbert Exception

When determining whether a law contains a mechanism for individualized exemptions - thereby placing it outside the scope of Smith - courts focus on the enforcement
of the law to determine whether it is being applied inconsistently among different religions or as between religious and secular individuals. 171 Under this type of analysis, the
courts' primary concern is the government's ability to assess who is exempt from and
who must comply with the law. 172 This concern stems from the fact that such a decision
is purely discretionary, and the government can use this decision-making authority in a

discriminatory manner. 173 In Smith, the Court noted that the Sherbert line of cases all
involved religious individuals who were denied unemployment benefits by government
employees who were accorded a high degree of discretion in assessing the applicants'
eligibility benefits. 1 74 In other words, unelected officials were making entirely subjective
determinations of whether an applicant's reason for seeking unemployment benefits con17 5
stituted "good cause."
When determining whether the Sherbert exception is applicable, a court must first
consider whether the law in question contains a mechanism akin to the "good cause" criterion, allowing significant discretion.176 If such a mechanism is present, the court must
then determine whether the law is enforced discriminatorily. 177 This determination focuses on whether the exemption is enforced impartially as between secular and religious
applicants or among different religious applicants. 17 8 However, it is not enough that a
challenged law or regulation allows exemptions based on subjective criteria; if the goverment does not enforce the law in a discriminatory manner, the Sherbert exception is
inapplicable. 179
169. See generally id. at 531-47.
170. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990), supersededby statute,
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012) (citation omitted).
171. Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1080-81.
172. Id.at 1083.
173. Lukuin, 508 U.S. at 542 ("All laws are selective to some extent, but categories of selection are of paramount concern when a law has the incidental effect of burdening religious practice."). See also Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) (reasoning that the government's "refusal to extend an exemption to an instance of
religious hardship suggests a discriminatory intent").
174. Smith, 494 U.S at 884.
175. Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1081.
176. Id. This includes laws, statutes, regulations and policies that contain "good cause" exceptions, or prohibit conduct "other than in cases of hardship," or that apply in "exceptional circumstances." ld. at 1081 n.175.
Each of these exceptions requires an assessment of an individual's specific circumstances "without reference to
any ... objective standard." Id.
177. Id. at 1081.
178. See, e.g., Rader v. Johnson, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1546-47, 1551 (D. Neb. 1966) (finding that an exemption that required a university administrator to determine whether a student should be allowed to live offcampus due to "significant and truly exceptional circumstances" was not enforced impartially as between religious and secular applicants and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny review).
179. Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1081.
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The Sherbert Exception Does Not Apply to the IIHS's Contraceptive
Coverage Mandate

Under the HHS's contraceptive coverage mandate, an employer may apply for a
religious exemption, pursuant to which the employer will not be penalized if it does not
provide contraceptive coverage in its employees' health plans. 180 For an organization to
qualify as a "religious employer," it must meet the following four criteria:
(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organization.
(2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the organization.
(3) The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious
tenets of the organization.
(4) The organization is a nonprofit organization as described in section
6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue
18 1
Code of 1986, as amended.
In addressing this religious exemption provision, the USCCB argues that the
HHS's contraceptive coverage mandate contains a system of "individualized exemptions," whereby the HHS will apply this exemption to exclude certain employers from
complying with the contraceptive mandate on a case-by-case basis. 182 The USCCB
claims that the mandate triggers the Sherbert exception because it "stands in stark contrast to the kind of across-the-board rules that the Court in Smith was so concerned to insulate from constitutional challenge in cases where they happen to burden religious [free]
18 3
exercise."
This assertion constitutes an inaccurate interpretation of the Sherbert exception, for
it assumes that the law is subject to strict scrutiny review any time the government applies an exemption on a case-by-case basis. 184 The USCCB fails to consider that although Smith established that the government is not required to grant religious believers
an exemption from a law of neutral and general applicability, the legislature still has the
185
option to grant religious believers exemptions from the law or regulation at issue.
Writing for the majority in Smith, Justice Scalia explained that "[i]t may fairly be said
that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage
those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself." 186 Thus, Smith's free exercise precedent did not prohibit

180. Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011).
181. Id. In issuing this narrow exemption, the HHS intended to extend contraceptive coverage "to as many
women as possible" by "respect[ing] the unique relationship between a house of worship and its employees in
ministerial positions." Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46621, 46623 (Aug. 3,2011) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
182. Picarello & Moses, supranote 28, at 9-10.

183. Id. at 10.
184. Id.
185. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990), superseded by statute,
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012).
186. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol48/iss1/5

18

STALLNGS (Do NOT DELETE)

1/23/2013 12:49 PM

Stallings: A Tough Pill to Swallow: Whether the Patient Protection and Affor
2012

A TOUGH PILL TO SWALLOW

135

legislatures from exempting religious institutions from laws of neutral and general applicability, but rather encouraged it.
Under a Sherbert exception analysis, the court must first determine if the HHS's
authority to assess whether a particular organization qualifies as a "religious employer"
for purposes of the exemption constitutes a mechanism similar to the "good cause" criterion, affording the HHS unrestricted discretionary interpretation. 187 In regard to this inquiry, the contraceptive coverage mandate is vulnerable to attack because the HHS will
effectively assess each organization that applies for an exemption based on whether it
has the "purpose" of inculcating religious values and whether it "primarily" serves and
employs persons who share the religious tenets of the organization. 18 8 The terms "purpose" and "primarily" are so amorphous that a court could easily view the exemption
provision as a grant of unchecked discretion. 189 Therefore, the court must continue its
analysis to determine whether the HHS enforces the exemption impartially among different religions. 190 To prevail under this inquiry, a Catholic organization must show that the
HHS denied it an exemption from the contraceptive mandate, but granted one to some
other religiously affiliated organization. 191 Absent a Catholic employer's ability to show
such evidence of discrimination in the enforcement of the regulation, the Sherbert exception does not apply, and the mandate will not be subject to strict scrutiny review under
192
the Free Exercise Clause.
In summary, the HHS's contraceptive coverage mandate is neutral, generally applicable, and does not contain a mechanism of individualized exemptions; therefore, the
court will presume its constitutionality under the Free Exercise Clause. 193 Consequently,
a Catholic employer must prove that the contraceptive coverage mandate violates the
statutory protections of the RFRA in order to subject the mandate to strict scrutiny review. 194
V.

A.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT JURISPRUDENCE AND ANALYSIS

RFRA Jurisprudenceand 0 Centro

The Supreme Court's holding in Smith sparked public outrage and prompted several religious leaders, churches, civil liberties and religious organizations, and politicians
to lobby Congress to overturn Smith by statute. 195 In 1993, Congress overtly countermanded the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in Smith by pass-

187. Kaplan, supranote 29, at 1081.
188. Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011).
189. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717 (1981) (noting that
Indiana requires individuals who apply for unemployment compensation to demonstrate that they left their job
for "good cause" in connection with the job).
190. Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1080-81. Since the exemption only applies to religious organizations, it is not
necessary to inquire as to whether the standards are applied impartially as between secular and religious organizations.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 1080 83.
193. Id. at 1074.
194. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb 4 (2012).
195. See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1049 n.18.
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ing the RFRA, which has become "one of the most controversial pieces of legislation"
enacted during the Clinton administration. 196 The RFRA provides that the government
may not "substantially burden a person's exercise of religion," even by a law of general
applicability, without demonstrating that the application of the burden is "the least restrictive means" to advance a "compelling government interest."' 19 7 Congress based its
decision to pass the RFRA on findings that "laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden
religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise."' 198 In
essence, where the Supreme Court failed to recognize a constitutional right to religious
199
free exercise, Congress created one by statute.
Four years later in City of Boerne v. Flores,2 0 the Supreme Court declared the
RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state laws on the ground that it created rights
against state governments that Congress had no power to impose under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 201 The Court was silent, however, with regard to whether
the RFRA could be applied to federal laws. 202 Then, in 2006, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the RFRA as valid and enforceable against the federal government in
Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Unice do Vegetal.2 03 In 0 Centro, the Court
pronounced guiding principles for determining when courts should exempt a religious
believer from a federal law under the RFRA. 20 4 First, the plaintiff must establish a prima
facie RFRA case by proving that the application of a federal law or regulation imposes a
substantial burden on a sincere exercise of his religion. 2 05 If the plaintiff is successful,
the burden of proof then shifts to the govermnent to demonstrate that the burden furthers
a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of advancing that in20 6
terest.
In 0 Centro, the plaintiffs were members of a Brazilian Spiritist sect that consumed
tamine
trolled
drums

a hallucinogenic tea for sacramental purposes. 207 The tea contained dimethyltryp(generally referred to as "DMT"), a hallucinogen that is outlawed under the ConSubstances Act. 20 8 After customs inspectors seized a shipment containing three
of the tea, the sect filed suit against the government seeking declaratory and in-

196. Travis C. Wheeler, Note, An Economic Analysis of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 573, 573 (2000). While the RFRA invokes debate over the meaning of the Constitution's

text, the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment drafters, and basic policy questions concerning separation of
powers, federalism, and individual rights, these issues are outside the scope of this discussion.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb l(a) (b). The stated purpose of the RFRA, reflected in the title of the act, was "to
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. 17erner and Wisconsin v. Yoder." Id. §
2000bb(b)(1).
198. Id. § 2000bb(a)(2).
199. Wheeler, supranote 196, at 575.
200. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
201. Id. at 508.
202. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 n.1(2006) ("As originally enacted, RFRA applied to States as well as the Federal Government. In City of Boerne v. Flores, we held
the application to States to be beyond Congress' legislative authority under [Section Five] of the Fourteenth
Amendment." (internal citation omitted)).
203. Id. at418-39.
204. Id. at 428.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 424.
207. Id. at 423.
208. Id. at 425.
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junctive relief under the RFRA. 2 09 Conceding substantial burden of a sincere religious
belief, the government sought to justify its actions by arguing that it had a compelling
interest in preventing the diversion of DMT from the members of the sect to nonreligious
users. 2 1 To support this purported interest, the government noted an increase in the ille2 11
gal use of hallucinogens, and DMT in particular.
In contesting the government's assertion, the sect members argued that the market
for DMT was small, that the sect only imported small amounts of the tea, and that there
had been no problem with diversion in the past. 2 12 Upon concluding that the evidence of
diversion to nonreligious users was "virtually balanced," the Court held that the government failed to demonstrate a compelling interest. 2 13 By upholding the application of the
RFRA to federal law, the Supreme Court left Smith intact but also recognized a new
framework in free exercise jurisprudence, which can be articulated as follows: if a religious believer establishes that the application of a federal law or regulation constitutes a
substantial burden on a sincere exercise of religion, the government must provide sufficient evidence that application of the law or regulation is the least restrictive means of
2 14
achieving a compelling interest.
B.

Catholic Employers Can Raise a PrimaFacie Case that the Contraceptive
Coverage Mandate Violates Its Rights Under RFRA

According to the precedent set forth in 0 Centro, a Catholic employer can successfully raise a prima facie case under the RFRA because the HHS's contraceptive coverage
mandate imposes a substantial burden on a sincere exercise of the Catholic religion by
2 15
forcing Catholic employers to provide their employees coverage for contraceptives.
Although the existence of a substantial burden was a nonissue in 0 Centro, Sherbert previously established that a substantial burden exists, at a minimum, when the law or regulation at issue forces an individual "to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to accept [government benefits], on the other hand." 2 16 Catholic employers will likely meet this threshold because the HHS's contraceptive coverage mandate would force them to choose between providing contraceptive coverage in their employees' health plans and paying a penalty for dropping its employees' health insurance
2 17
coverage altogether.
Furthermore, courts should find that the Catholic Church's religious objection to
209. Id. at 425 26.
210. Id. at 426. The government also set forth two additional compelling interests arguments to justify its
action: "protecting the health and safety of [the sect] members ... and complying with the 1971 United Nations
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, a treaty signed by the United States." Id. These arguments present
issues that are outside the scope of this article.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 426-27, 439 (citation omitted).
214. See, e.g., id. at 428 39.

215. See id. at 428 (stating that a claimant must prove that enforcement of a federal law "would (1)
substantially burden (2) a sincere (3) religious exercise" to establish a prima facie RFRA case).
216. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
217. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1513, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codi-

fied as 42 U.S.C. § 1320d 2 (2012)).
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birth control is sincere, for its belief that contraception is "intrinsically evil" is deeply
rooted in its religious teachings on the sacrament of marriage, human sexuality, and procreation. 2 18 The sincerity of this belief is further illustrated by the Catholic Church's
maintenance of its stance against the use of birth control, despite mounting opposition
towards its position on the issue. 2 19 If, as the foregoing argument suggests is possible, a
Catholic employer establishes a prima facie case under the RFRA, the HHS must
demonstrate that the mandate furthers a compelling government interest and is the least
220
restrictive means of furthering that interest.
C.

The HHS's Contraceptive Coverage Mandate is the Least Restrictive Means of
Furtheringa Compelling Government Interest

Once the burden of proof shifts to the government, the HHS will be able to prove
that it has a compelling interest in providing women the preventive care necessary to stay
healthy and that the contraceptive coverage mandate is the least restrictive means of
achieving that interest. The Supreme Court has not provided clear guidance as to what
constitutes a compelling interest, but has rather addressed each case on an ad hoc basis. 22 1 However, the Supreme Court has noted that "a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest 'of the highest order' ... when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited." 222 In Lukumi, the Court found that the government's
purported interest in preventing animal cruelty was not compelling because the ordinance
only applied to the sacramental killing of animals and failed to prevent acts of animal
cruelty caused by other religious and secular animal killings.223 Hence, the government's
interest is not compelling if it restricts religiously motivated conduct but fails to restrict
224
other conduct that would produce the type of harm caused by the religious exercise.
In its comment to the HHS, the USCCB argues that the contraceptive coverage
mandate fails to further a compelling government interest because contraceptives do not
save lives or prevent disease, but rather "prevent the healthy state of pregnancy ... and
can actually introduce health risks. ' 2 25 This argument serves as a basis for the USCCB's
contention that the government has left the interest that it seeks to protect - i.e., wom226
exposed to the type of harm that contraceptives purportedly prevent.
en's health

218. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2730 (Doubleday, 2nd ed. 2003) (1994) ([E]very

action

which, whether in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its accomplishment or in the development of its natural
consequences, proposes, whether as an end or as a means, to render procreation impossible is intrinsically
evil.") (quoting PAUL VI, HUMANAE VITAE § 14 (1968)).

219. Susan J. Stabile, Christian Realism and Public Life: Catholicand ProtestantPerspectives: Article: An
Effort to Articulate a Catholic RealistApproach to Abortion, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 340, 365-66 (2010).

220. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb l(b) (2012).
221. Compare, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07 (holding that the government's interest in unifying unemployment compensation rules to prevent fraudulent religious objections was not compelling), iwith United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1982) (holding that the government's interest in unifying the collection of
Social Security taxes was compelling).
222. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) (citations omitted).
223. Id. at 546-47.
224. Id. at 546.
225. Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 10-11.
226. Id. at 11.
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Indisputably, the use of birth control pills can increase women's risk of stroke and blood
clots; however, women who take birth control pills are less likely to develop blood clots
than women who become pregnant. 227 Therefore, a Catholic employer cannot successfully argue that the government has left considerable damage to the very interest that it
seeks to protect.
Along the same line of reasoning, the USCCB argues that because Congress did
not explicitly require the HHS to include contraceptives as a preventive service, the contraceptive coverage mandate cannot serve a compelling interest. 22 8 This argument is fallacious because it presumes that a federal agency's interest is only compelling if the particulars of the regulation were previously specified by congressional statute. 22 9 To the
contrary, agencies exist, at least in large part, to utilize their expertise and resources to
regulate technical areas of law, and courts will often rely on an agency's expertise in determining that the government action furthers a compelling interest. 230 Here, the HHS's
decision to mandate contraceptive coverage is a direct result of the Institute of Medicine's scientific study and is therefore a well-informed medical decision. 23 1 For these
reasons, courts should find that the HHS's contraceptive coverage mandate serves a
compelling government interest.
With regard to the second prong of the strict scrutiny inquiry, the contraceptive
mandate is narrowly tailored to serve the government's compelling interest in providing
women preventive health care. When evaluating whether a law is narrowly tailored as
applied to religious practice, courts consider three elements. 232 First, the government's
infringement of free exercise rights must be necessary - i.e., there can be no less restric233
tive alternatives by which the government could accomplish its compelling interest.
Second, the government action that infringes on religious exercise cannot be underinclusive.234 That is, the government cannot fail to regulate activities that pose the same type
235
of harm that the government's purported compelling interest is designed to prevent.
By precluding underinclusive regulations, courts seek to ensure that the government will
not infringe on religious exercise when doing so will predictably fail to further a purported governmental interest. 2 36 And third, the infringement must not be overbroad. 237 This
prohibition essentially repeats the first requirement that the government regulation must
be necessary; however, unlike the least restrictive alternative formulation, courts may
condemn a government regulation for being overbroad even if there are no less restric-

227. Natasha Singer, Health Concerns over Popular Contraceptives, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2009),

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/health/26contracept.html?pagewanted-all.
228. Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 11 ("The law at issue here, at a minimum, admits of a construction
that allows no advancement at all of the interest of maximizing coverage for contraception ... as HHS is entirely free not to declare them 'preventive services."').
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (relying on the agency's expertise to
determine that the State has a compelling interest in protecting minors from harmful speech).
231. See No AdditionalCost, supra note 18.
232. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict JudicialScrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1326-29 (2007).

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1327.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1328.
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tive alternatives.
In contesting the legality of the contraceptive coverage mandate under the RFRA,
the USCCB argues that the mandate is underinclusive because many Catholic individuals
and employers will drop their health insurance coverage to avoid compromising their religious beliefs. 239 However, an evaluation of the PPACA reveals that the mandate is in
fact narrowly tailored. 240 Although some Catholic individuals and organizations may
contemplate dropping their health insurance coverage, the PPACA imposes a penalty on
individuals who do not obtain health insurance coverage as well as employers who do
not provide health plans to their employees. 24 1 These penalty provisions serve as enforcement mechanisms and will deter the majority of individuals and employers - not
just Catholic employers - from dropping coverage. 242 Therefore, the USCCB's argument that several Catholic individuals and employers will drop health insurance coverage
does not support a finding that the mandate is underinclusive.
Another arguable claim for underinclusiveness is that, notwithstanding the federal
mandate, several women will not have access to contraceptive coverage because the
HHS has allowed Catholic Churches and houses of worship to apply for religious exemptions. Although the USCCB did not voice this objection in its comment to the HHS, this
argument was raised by a Catholic organization that sought exemption under California's
contraceptive coverage law, which contained a religious exemption identical to the one at
hand. 243 In that case, however, the California Supreme Court, finding that the State's
mandate was neutral, generally applicable, and did not fall under the Sherbert exception,
dismissed the issue of underinclusiveness. 24 4 Nevertheless, this argument of underinclusiveness is likely to resurface under a RFRA claim, and is therefore worthy of evaluation.
In this situation, a court is not likely to find that the federal contraceptive mandate
is underinclusive because nonreligious employees generally comprise a small portion of
a Church's staff.24 5 Since the majority of church employees tend to share the same religious beliefs as their employer, the religious exemption will affect few women. 24 6 Contrariwise, the government can prove that granting exemptions to Catholic-based organizations that employ non-Catholic workers - e.g., Catholic hospitals - would inhibit the
effectiveness of providing contraceptive coverage to women because doing so would
place a great number of women at risk of facing barriers to contraceptive access. 247 Be-

238. Id.
239. Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 11 ("[T]he mandate is not well tailored to the goal of expanding
access to coverage, because it encourages individuals and organizations to drop coverage." (citation omitted)).
240. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501, 1513, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as 42 U.S.C. § 18091, 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012)).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Petitioner's Reply Memorandum, Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. California, 543 U.S. 816 (2004)
(No. 03-1618), 2004 WL 1900732 at *8 (arguing that the law mandating contraceptive coverage is far more
underinclusive than the ordinances in Lukumi because "it allows employers unilaterally to opt out altogether
from the provision of prescription drug coverage").
244. Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento Cnty., 32 Cal. 4th 527 (Cal. 2004).
245. See Lowell, supranote 27, at 460.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 457 58.
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cause excluding such a large pool of workers would severely undermine the government's interest in expanding contraceptive access to women, the government can demonstrate that the mandate is not overbroad. 24 8 Since the federal mandate is neither underinclusive nor overbroad and is the least restrictive means of furthering the government's
interest, it is narrowly tailored. 2 49 Therefore, the mandate does not violate the statutory
protections of the RFRA, and courts will not exempt Catholic employers who do not
otherwise qualify for an exemption under the contraceptive regulation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While the federal government's contraceptive coverage mandate will greatly benefit the reproductive health of women across the country, several Catholic employers will
be forced to contradict their religious teachings against the use of birth control. Because
the United States was founded upon and remains committed to the concept of religious
exercise free from governmental intrusion, the constitutionality and legality of the contraceptive coverage mandate are controversial issues, and courts will be called upon to
balance these competing public interests. Analysis of the free exercise doctrine reveals
that the HHS's contraceptive coverage mandate is a valid exercise of the government's
legislative power in light of Supreme Court precedent - in particular, Smith, Lukumi,
and 0 Centro. When Smith and Lukumi are read together, these cases stand for the proposition that the contraceptive coverage mandate is neutral and generally applicable and
does not contain a system of individualized exemptions. Therefore, courts will presume
the mandate's constitutionality under the Free Exercise Clause. However, the contraceptive coverage mandate does impose a substantial burden on Catholic employers' religious exercise, and therefore, pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in 0 Centro, the
mandate must withstand strict scrutiny to pass muster. Under this heightened standard of
judicial review, the government can demonstrate a compelling interest in providing
women preventive health care and that the contraceptive mandate is narrowly tailored to
advance this interest. Therefore, the federal contraceptive coverage mandate does not
constitute a violation of Catholic employers' constitutional or federally guaranteed free
exercise rights.

IDestyn D. Stallings

248. See Fallon, supra note 232, at 1328.
249. See id. at 1326.
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